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Abstract 
 
The surge of Government debt during the post-global financial crisis and the 
ongoing euro zone sovereign debt crisis has begun raising concerns whether 
government debt levels have hit the tipping points. This study offers to 
contribute in the following ways: First, we find out whether the relationship 
between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios 
below 90%. Second, we estimate different thresholds for groups of economies 
based on their debt regimes, political economy structures and types of political 
governance, geographical considerations, and income levels. Third, we find 
out whether there is a declining negative effect beyond the debt threshold. Our 
results find the debt thresholds to vary in the range of 84 to 114 percent of 
GDP. We estimate that every additional 10 percent rise in debt-to-GDP ratio 
beyond the debt threshold costs 10 to 30 basis points of annual average real 
GDP growth. We find that different groups of countries experience debt 
threshold at different levels. Debt thresholds are dependent not necessarily on 
economic factors alone, but on other factors such as political economies and 
governance structures, geographies etc. Debt thresholds are sensitive to 
horizon of analysis.  
 
Keywords: Government Debt, economic growth, debt thresholds, panel data,  
           nonlinearity, country groupings 
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1. Introduction 
 In the backdrop of global financial crisis followed by the eurozone debt crisis, the 
advanced economies are at a crucial juncture as they face high debt levels. While some 
economists urge for more fiscal stimulus, others argue that raising debt levels would stunt 
economic growth and hence advocate austerity. Debt levels and debt thresholds have thus 
become central to the discussion of economic growth in advanced economies. A great deal of 
debate has been generated since the publication of Reinhart & Rogoff‟s (RR) influential 
findings on the threshold effect of Government debt that a debt to GDP ratio of 90% or more 
could have a negative impact on growth. Their work drew pointed scrutiny from critics on 
endogeneity problems, existence of a common threshold and related issues. RR‟s findings 
have sparked a new literature seeking to assess whether their results were robust to allow for 
non-arbitrary debt brackets, control variables in a multivariate regression setup, reverse 
causality, and cross-country heterogeneity. 
 
 Growing empirical literature on government debt indicates a negative correlation 
between government debt and economic growth. This correlation becomes particularly strong 
when government debt approaches 100 percent of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010a; 2010b; 
Kumar and Woo 2010; Cecchetti et al. 2011). Cecchetti et al. (2011) use a sample of 18 
OECD countries and derive a threshold for government debt at 85 percent of GDP. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (RR), in their influential articles, argue that higher levels of government debt are 
negatively correlated with economic growth, but that there is no link between debt and 
growth when government debt is below 90 percent of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010a; 
Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff 2012). They deftly state that their results did not prove the 
existence of a causal relationship going from debt to growth. After the publication of the 
(critique) article by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) challenging some of RR‟s findings, the 
discussion on the relationship between debt and growth in advanced economies has become 
more animated. Krugman (2010), citing the case of Japan, argues that the link between debt 
and growth could be driven by the fact that it is low economic growth that leads to high levels 
of government debt.  
 
In their much-debated study, RR demonstrate the threshold effect using the annual data 
on debt and growth for 20 advanced economies for the period 1946–2009. They split their 
sample based on country-years of public debt into four groups: (i) below 30 percent of GDP; 
(ii) between 30 to 60 percent of GDP; (iii) between 60 to 90 percent of GDP; and (iv) above 
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90 percent of GDP. Thereafter, they estimate median and average GDP growth for each 
group to show that average and median GDP growth are significantly lower in the fourth 
group. They show that in the high debt group, median growth is approximately 1 percentage 
point lower and average growth is nearly 4 percentage points lower than that in other groups. 
 
Some of the criticisms against RR‟s findings are that they suffer from econometric 
shortcomings. First, the findings are derived in the absence of supportive econometric tests 
for the relevance of the regimes. Second, the specification of exogenous thresholds in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio seems arbitrary in the absence of specific evidence to support the same. 
Third, the transitions around the debt thresholds appear to be abrupt. An important limitation 
is the failure to account adequately for heterogeneity in the effect of debt on growth that may 
arise due to alternative growth theories. There could be substantial cross-country 
heterogeneity in the debt-growth relationship though no evidence of systematic within-
country non-linearities (Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2013). Alternatively, why should we 
believe a priori that the effect of public debt on growth is confined only by excessive levels 
of debt? Further, why should the thresholds be not investigated endogenously employing 
appropriate econometric methods? We believe that nonlinear effects might be more complex 
and intricate to model than previously thought as they change over time, across countries and 
economic conditions. 
 
 We notice five inadequacies from the foregoing empirical debt-growth literature. First, 
none of the above-mentioned papers uses a dynamic panel threshold approach. Though we 
find Baum et al., (2013) employ dynamic panel threshold methodology to analyse the non-
linear impact of public debt on GDP growth, their study is confined to 12-euro area countries 
for the period 1990–2010. Second, none of the studies has focused on the different groupings 
of economies based on their political structures, income levels, regional geographies and debt 
regimes. Third,  we do not find studies emphasising the need for establishing the presence of 
a causal link going from debt to growth and requires finding what economists call an 
„instrumental variable‟. Fourth, none of the papers offers a comprehensive analysis of the 
dynamics of Government debt and growth encompassing the use of dynamic panel threshold 
approach, verifying the correctness of debt thresholds, estimating the growth costs of debt 
intolerance beyond debt threshold. Fifth, there is a need to expand the horizon of the data 
sample as averaging across OECD / advanced countries alone would make such inferences 
difficult. 
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 This study seeks to put a dataset comparable to that of RR to a schematic econometric 
testing by first using similar debt regimes proposed by RR and then estimate the thresholds 
endogenously. We are interested to know are there different thresholds for different groups of 
economies based on their debt regimes, political economy structures, geographical 
considerations, and income levels. We seek to know whether the relationship between debt 
and growth is weak for debt levels below 90% of GDP. Is there a declining negative 
relationship between debt and growth as the threshold levels are crossed? How critical would 
the impact of government debt be on growth beyond the threshold? What happens if the 
government debt stays above this threshold for an extended period? 
 
 Our study is unique as it overcomes the issues related to data adequacy, coverage of 
countries, heterogeneity, endogeneity, and non-linearities. We contribute to the current strand 
of literature on government debt and economic growth by extending the horizon of analysis 
to several country groupings and make the study inclusive of economic, political and regional 
diversities. More precisely, we find answers to: (i) whether the relationship between 
government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below 90%? (ii) Are 
there different thresholds for different groups of economies based on their debt regimes, 
political economy structures and types of political governance, geographical considerations, 
and income levels? (iii) Is there a declining negative relationship between debt and growth 
beyond the debt threshold? (iv) How critical would the impact of government debt be on 
growth beyond the threshold? and (v) What happens if the government debt stays above this 
threshold for an extended period of time? We provide a thorough econometric analysis of 
countries with large sample drawn from diverse groupings and allows for non-linearity 
estimation. Our data-intensive approach offers stylized facts, well beyond selective anecdotal 
evidence. We investigate the existence of an endogenously estimated threshold using a novel 
econometric technique that allows dealing properly with complex non-linearities on panel 
data. We validate our estimations by providing the evidence of debt intolerance for growth 
beyond the estimated threshold levels. This paper makes a distinct contribution to the debate 
by offering new empirical evidence based on a sizeable data set. 
 
  The paper is organised as follows. We present our data in section 2. In section 3, 
we describe the estimation debt thresholds. We estimate the effects of debt intolerance in 
terms of growth costs of exceeding the debt threshold in Section 4. In section 5, we discuss 
the results and conclude in Section 6. 
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2. Data 
 Our dataset comprises annual macroeconomic data on 252 countries, over the period 
1960-2009. To maintain homogeneity in as much as it is for a large sample of countries over 
the course of five decades, we employ as a primarily source World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database 2014 of World Bank. We strengthen our data with the use of supplementary 
data sourced from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2014 database, 
International Financial Statistics and data files, and Reinhart and Rogoff dataset on Debt-to-
GDP ratios. 
 
  In addition to our full sample, we arrange our data into five broad categories: (i) debt 
regimes, (ii) economy groupings, (iii) income groupings, (iv) political governance groupings, 
and (v) regional groupings. We place each of the 252 countries in the WDI list into its 
relevant category of our country groupings. However, each country‟s entry into the group is 
dependent on the data adequacy. Exclusion of any country of the WDI list from our sampling 
is solely due to data considerations (either non-availability or inadequacy of data). The list of 
countries covered in detail under different groupings and sub-groupings are provided in 
annexure 1 to 5.  
Debt regime based groupings 
 We group our sample countries into five debt regime groupings: 0-30%, 31-60%, 61-
90%, 91-150%, and >151% comparable to RR groupings based on the average debt/GDP 
levels (Table 1).  
 Table 1: Sample description for debt regimes 
Panel A: Sample frame for debt regime groupings 
Period DR 0-30% DR 31-60% DR 61-90% DR 91 & above DR 151 & above Total 
1960-2009 29 56 18 14 5 122 
1970-2009 32 52 20 14 4 122 
1980-2009 24 53 24 16 5 122 
1990-2009 24 51 24 18 5 122 
2000-2009 24 45 20 13 5 107 
Panel B: Government Debt and GDP Growth in debt regimes  
Countries observations Debt Regime 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
8 160 0-30% 5.06% 4.83% 27.15 27.79 
31 620 31-60% 3.79% 3.68% 58.29 45.00 
20 400 61-90% 2.71% 2.70% 80.08 82.87 
13 260 91-150% 1.86% 1.88% 115.50 116.51 
4 80 >151% -1.08% -1.32% 176.75 160.99 
Total=76 1520 
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Economy Groupings 
 The World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF
1
guides our classification of countries 
into advanced, emerging and developing. In addition, we consider two more broad groupings: 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and OECD
2
 (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development). Sample description for economy-based 
groupings is provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Sample description for economy groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for economy groupings 
Period Advanced Emerging OECD BRICS Developing Total 
1960-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
1970-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
1980-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
1990-2009 34 22 34 5 80 175 
2000-2009 32 22 32 5 68 159 
Panel B: Government Debt and GDP Growth in economy groupings 
Countries observations Economies 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
32 640 Advanced 2.39% 2.83% 57.12 53.38 
5 100 BRICS 4.32% 4.70% 46.65 46.79 
57 1140 Developing 3.36% 4.26% 71.63 56.67 
21 420 Emerging 3.41% 4.70% 43.73 41.35 
33 660 OECD 2.64% 2.90% 55.17 51.61 
Total=148 2960 
     
 
Income Groupings 
In arranging the data for income groupings, we follow the World Bank classification of 
economies
3
updated for the fiscal year 2015. We consider high-income economies (HIC), 
heavily indebted poor countries (HPC), least developed countries (LDC), low-income 
economies (LIC), and middle-income economies (MIC). Table 3 provides the description of 
our sample based on income groupings. 
 
                                                          
1 World Economic Outlook April 2011 of IMF (Table 4.1: Economy groupings) is available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf 
2 The details about OECD members are available at http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-
countries.htm 
3 World Bank country classification is available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups Accordingly, 
low income countries are those with gross national income (GNI) per capita of $1,045 or less; middle income countries, 
$1,046–12,745; high-income countries, $12,746 or more. The least developed countries (LDC) are classified as per the 
criteria set by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.  
Details available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf 
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are classified according to the World Bank and IMF as part of their debt-relief 
initiative. These classifications are detailed in the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2014 of the United 
Nations employed to delineate trends in various dimensions of the world economy. Also, refer Handbook on the Least 
Developed Country Category: Inclusion, Graduation and Special Support Measures (United Nations publication). Available 
from http://www.un.org/esa/analysis/devplan/cdppublications/2008cdphandbook.pdf 
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Table 3: Sample description for income groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for income groupings 
Period 
Low-income 
(LIC) 
Middle-income 
(MIC) 
High-income 
(HIC) 
Heavily indebted 
poor (HPC) 
Least developed 
(LDC) 
Total 
1960-2009 15 63 44 18 17 220 
1970-2009 16 62 44 19 18 221 
1980-2009 16 62 44 19 18 221 
1990-2009 16 62 44 19 18 221 
2000-2009 10 54 43 11 9 181 
Panel B. Government Debt and GDP Growth in Income groupings 
Countries Observations Economies 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
38 760 High-income countries (HIC) 2.62% 3.10% 49.99 45.89 
16 320 
Heavily indebted poor countries 
(HPC) 
3.12% 3.95% 124.10 103.87 
12 240 Least developed countries (LDC) 3.76% 4.78% 100.86 81.39 
11 220 Low-income countries (LIC) 2.92% 4.17% 91.37 87.06 
34 680 Middle-income countries (MIC) 3.72% 4.56% 52.17 42.73 
Total=111 2220 
     
 
 
Table 4: Sample description for political governance groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for political governance groupings 
Period 
Socialist or 
Communist 
Countries 
(SC) 
Dictator 
led 
Countries 
(DC) 
Coalition 
Countries 
(CC) 
Monarchy 
Countries 
(MC) 
Islamic 
Countries 
(IC) 
Parliamentary 
Democracies 
(PD) 
Federal 
Democracies 
(FD) 
Total 
1960-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
1970-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
1980-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
1990-2009 2 12 54 4 23 45 21 161 
2000-2009 2 8 48 4 18 37 19 136 
Panel B:  Government Debt and GDP Growth in political governance groupings 
Countries Observations Countries 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
31 620 Coalition Countries (CC) 3.10% 3.24% 66.24 61.59 
10 180 Dictator led Countries (DC) 3.85% 4.45% 87.63 69.63 
14 280 Federal Democracies (FD) 3.11% 3.36% 54.26 54.83 
23 440 Islamic Countries (IC) 4.16% 4.90% 72.76 64.76 
4 80 Monarchy Countries (MC) 4.92% 4.86% 40.31 23.61 
16 320 Parliamentary Democracies (PD) 3.03% 3.15% 67.81 65.12 
2 40 Socialist/Communist Countries (SC) 6.32% 5.75% 36.44 18.74 
Total=98 1960 
     
 
Political governance groupings 
We consider seven well acknowledged types of political governance systems; coalition-
governments countries (CC), dictator-led countries (DC), federal democracies (FD), Islamic 
countries (IC), monarchy countries (MC), parliamentary democracies (PD), and 
socialist/communist countries (SC). In doing so, we are guided by the World Fact book of 
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CIA
4
 and Encyclopedia Britannica. Table 4 provides the description of our sample based on 
political economy considerations. 
 
Regional groupings 
The fifth of our groupings is based on geographical considerations. We consider six broad 
classifications - Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania and South America. In doing 
so, we are guided by the publication of United Nations Statistics Division
5
. Table 5 provides 
the description of our sample based on regional groupings.  
 
Table 5: Sample description for regional groupings 
Panel A: Sample frame for regional groupings 
Period Asia South America North America Europe Africa Oceania Total 
1960-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
1970-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
1980-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
1990-2009 25 16 10 39 27 5 122 
2000-2009 24 17 9 36 18 3 107 
Panel B: Sample description for regional groupings 
Countries Observations Regions 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
21 420 Africa 3.35% 3.92% 91.94 80.08 
19 380 Asia 4.49% 5.18% 57.36 52.23 
34 680 Europe 1.99% 2.92% 55.04 51.47 
7 140 North America 3.50% 3.47% 57.45 54.85 
4 80 Oceania 2.92% 3.14% 42.39 43.87 
15 300 South America 3.66% 3.96% 69.25 45.66 
Total=100 2000 
     
 
Subsampling 
 We explore the dimension of historical specificity by examining real GDP growth by 
government debt category for subsampled periods of the data: 1960-2009, 1970-2009, 1980-
2009, 1990-2009, and 2000-2009. We do not extend our dataset beyond 2009, in view of the 
sudden and significant rise in government debt levels consequent to the government 
interventions in response to global financial 
 
 
                                                          
4 The World Factbook of The Central Intelligence Agency of United States provides information on the history, people, 
government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities. 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
Encyclopedia Britannica | political system. Details available at http://www.britannica.com/print/topic/467746 
5 United Nations Statistics Division - Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49). Details available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
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Variables 
We provide in Table 6 the description of variables and data sources. 
Table 6: Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description 
adr  
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population) 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or 
older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are 
shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population. 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 
fce  
Final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Final consumption expenditure is the sum of household final consumption 
expenditure (private consumption) and general government final consumption 
expenditure (general government consumption). Source: WDI 
fdi  
Foreign direct investment,  
net inflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investments are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.  
Source: WDI 
gdpgr (GDPgrowth) 
Real GDP growth (annual %) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
gfc  
General government final 
consumption expenditure 
(annual % growth) 
Annual percentage growth of general government final consumption 
expenditure based on constant local currency. Source: WDI 
gfcf  
Gross fixed capital formation 
(annual % growth) 
Average annual growth of gross fixed capital formation based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
ggd (debt) 
General government gross 
debt 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of 
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the 
future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, 
debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee 
schemes, and other accounts payable.   
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) 
data set 
infl  
Inflation (annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. Source: WDI 
pg  
Population growth (annual %) 
Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of 
midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Source: WDI 
rir 
Real interest rate (%) 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator.  
Source: WDI 
tgdp (openness) 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. Source: WDI 
ulf 
Unemployed labour force 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and 
unemployment differ by country. Source: WDI 
  
 
 
We present the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in different groupings of 
our sample in Figure 1 to 5. 
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Figure 1: Government debt and growth in debt Regimes 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in debt regimes: 0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; 151 % above for the period from 1960-2009.  
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Figure 2: Government debt and growth in economy groupings 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in economy groupings: advanced countries, BRICS, developing countries, 
emerging countries, and OECD countries during the period 1960-2009.  
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Figure 3: Government debt and growth in income groupings 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in income groupings: high-income countries (HIC), highly indebted poor 
countries (HPC), least developed countries (LDC), low-income countries (LIC), and middle-income countries (MIC) during the period 1960-2009.  
 
 
-3
0
.0
0
-2
0
.0
0
-1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
G
R
O
W
T
H
0.00 50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00
DEBT
HIC
-6
0
-4
0
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
G
ro
w
th
0 200 400 600 800 1000
DEBT
HPC
-6
0
-4
0
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
G
ro
w
th
0 100 200 300 400 500
DEBT
LDC
-6
0
-4
0
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
G
ro
w
th
0 100 200 300
DEBT
LIC
-4
0
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
G
ro
w
th
0 100 200 300 400 500
DEBT
MIC
 
 
13 
 
Figure 4: Government debt and growth in political governance groupings 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in political governance groupings: Islamic countries (IC); coalition countries (CC); 
dictator led countries (DC); federal democracies (FD); monarchy countries (MC); parliamentary democracies (PD); and socialist countries (SC) during the period 
1960-2009. 
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Figure 5: Government debt and growth in regional groupings 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in regional groupings: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South 
America during the period 1960-2009. 
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3. Estimation of Debt Thresholds  
 The theoretical literature on optimal debt level provides a rather unclear guidance. 
Different models, with different assumptions about household behavior, market completeness 
and time horizons, deliver different predictions about the optimal debt. The Barro-Ricardian 
literature almost stays silent on the issue of debt optimality. Keynesian view argues that rise 
in public debt can be welfare enhancing as it enhances both current and future consumption. 
The neoclassicals emphasize the positive effects of debt reduction particularly on investment. 
However, more literature that is recent contends for a broader role for government debt. It is 
desirable to research with large data sets to provide the empirical evidence on how debt levels 
shape economic growth. 
 
 Threshold models among the nonlinear regression models are attractive as they allow 
for regression that is a more flexible functional form of splitting data with certain unknown 
threshold values. Our modeling draws significant motivation from the threshold testing 
procedure proposed by Hansen (1999). Threshold regression models allow individual 
observations to be categorised based on the value of an observed variable. Hansen (1999) 
suggests that Least squares estimation of the threshold and regression slopes could be made 
using fixed-effects transformations and then Threshold regression methods could be 
developed for non-dynamic panels with individual specified fixed effects. Further, a non-
standard asymptotic theory of inference allows for construction of confidence intervals and 
testing of hypotheses. Panel threshold regression (PTR) model (Hansen, 1999, 2000) is 
superior to other models used to compute non-linear function and facilitate in estimating 
exogenous thresholds, rather than fixing them at arbitrary values.  
 
The structural equation of interest is as below: 
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------ Eqn. (1)  
 
where the data is from the balanced panel with Ttnjxqy
j
t
j
t
j
t
 1,1:,, . The 
dependent variable y
j
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is a scalar, the threshold variable q
j
t
is also a scalar and the regressor 
x
j
t
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t
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j
t
, jt ) are 
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independent and identically distributed (iid) across j and are standard for fixed effect panel 
models with strictly exogenous regressors. 
^
1
 and 
^
2
are the differing regression slopes 
distinguishing the regimes. The asymptotic analysis is with fixed T as n→∞. We now need to 
know whether the threshold effect is statistically significant. The null hypothesis of threshold 
effect is represented by the linear constraint 
^
2
^
10
H . The null of no threshold effect is 
not accepted if the p-value is lesser than the desired critical value. We set the indicator to use 
White-correction for heteroskedasticity. We employ sample trimming from the ends at 
p=0.15 level; confidence interval at 95%; and run a minimum of 5000 number of bootstraps 
to fine-tune the results in all the rounds of estimations for our different sample groupings.  
 
Rewriting the Eqn. (1) in terms of our study variables: 
 
      jtj
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j
t
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j
t DebtSDebtSGDPgrowth II 
^
2
^
1
  --- Eqn. (2) 
 
where Sj is a vector of Solow regressors including gfcf, gfc, tgdp, fce, fdi, infl, pg, and adr. 
Debt is the threshold variable with GDP growth as the dependent variable. The above 
threshold regression specification with individual-specific effects is straightforward in 
estimating a fixed effects transformation. The asymptotic theory is believed to be non-
standard, but confidence intervals for the threshold are constructed by inverting the likelihood 
ratio statistic, as this construction is a natural by-product of the estimation method (Hansen, 
1999). 
 
 We present the panel threshold regression estimations for all the groupings in our 
sample in Table 7 to 11. The main result for the full sample for the period 1960-2009 is that 
the debt threshold is at 106.32 percent of GDP (see Table 7). We find debt thresholds for the 
periods 1970-2009 at 105.03%, 1980-2009 at 97.95%, 1990-2009 at 114.81%, and 2000-
2009 at 84.19 %. These period-specific results suggest that the debt thresholds are not only 
country-specific but also time-variant. On an average, we find the debt thresholds to vary in 
the range of 84 to 114 percent of GDP for the full sample.  
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Table 7: Panel threshold estimations for full sample 
This table reports the estimated threshold levels of debt (as percent of GDP) with confidence intervals for 
different periods as described in Table 4. We also report the period of study sample, number of countries in 
the estimation panels, F-value, confidence interval at 95%, sum of squared residuals (SSR), and estimated 
residual variance (ERV). 
Period N Threshold level F-value C.I at 95% SSR ERV 
Full Sample 
      
[2000-2009] 107 84.19 53.4611 013.3960 - 136.4260 8954.77 9.2988 
[1990-2009] 103 114.81 717.7543 113.5430 - 114.8510 29485.93 15.066 
[1980-2009] 67 97.95 172.5104 083.1188 - 099.8180 16974.21 8.7361 
[1970-2009] 67 105.03 784.3457 103.6898 - 106.1670 27875.71 10.668 
[1960-2009] 46 106.32 180.4392 095.0700 - 106.3200 16953.92 7.5217 
       
         
 Our results for the full sample are comparable to the estimations of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) who argue that growth slows down considerably as the government debt-to-
GDP ratio moves beyond 90%. They rely on descriptive statistics of the advanced economies 
to show that debt has a detrimental effect on GDP growth as surpasses their estimated 
threshold.  
 
 A strand of recent empirical literature broadly seems to endorse the existence of a 
negative nonlinear effect of government debt on economic growth and the existence of 
threshold. Kumar and Woo (2010) establish the non-linear effects of debt on growth in their 
panel of 38 advanced and emerging countries for the period from 1970-2007. Using dummy 
variables for pre-determined ranges of debt they show that only very high (above 90 percent 
of GDP) levels have a significant negative impact. Caner et al. (2010) report the threshold 
level of the average long-run public debt to GDP at 77.1 percent for 79 countries for the 
period 1980-2010 (97.95 percent in our study for the comparable period). They also report a 
lower debt threshold at 64 percent of GDP for a subsample of 55 developing countries. 
Alternative to the use of a set of pre-determined debt to GDP brackets in comparing the 
growth, Minea and Parent (2012) employ panel smooth threshold regression (PSTR) model 
and find that debt has negative association with growth in the horizon of 90 to 115 percent. 
They also notice that the correlation turns positive as the debt surpasses the 115 percent level 
suggesting the existence of complex non-linearities that might not be captured by models that 
employed a set of exogenous thresholds. 
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Table 8: Panel threshold estimations for Political economy groupings 
This table reports the estimated threshold levels of debt (as percent of GDP) with confidence intervals for 
different political economy groupings as described in Table 4. The list of countries covered in this grouping is 
provided in Annexure 4. We also report the period of study sample, number of countries in the estimation 
panels, F-value, confidence interval at 95%, sum of squared residuals (SSR), and estimated residual variance 
(ERV). 
Period N Threshold level F-value C.I at 95% SSR ERV 
1. Coalition Countries 
     
[1990-2009] 31 84.30 50.5592 081.7640 - 099.8750 2158.30 3.6644 
2. Parliamentary Democracies 
    
[1990-2009] 16 87.49 28.0446 031.7430 - 094.4715 816.05 2.6844 
3. Islamic Countries  
     
[1990-2009] 22 84.90 83.4781 083.0410 - 097.0000 7831.59 18.735 
4. Dictator led Countries 
    
[1980-2009] 8 88.87 41.2033 060.0000 - 115.3300 4326.29 18.647 
5. Monarchy Countries 
    
[1980-2009] 4 21.39 40.7048 020.3820 - 090.9866 1401.25 12.079 
6. Federal Democracies 
    
[1980-2009] 14 40.73 72.8674 040.4662 - 042.5800 1103.61 2.7183 
7. Socialist/Communist Countries 
    
[1990-2009] 2 26.81 11.0893 007.4280 - 098.3760 45.83 1.2062 
       
        
 Coalition ruled countries are observed to experience debt threshold at 84.30 percent of 
GDP (see results in Table 8). This result is quite lower than the comparable period result of 
the full sample at 114 percent. Islamic countries are of special nature owing to their 
authoritarian adherence to Sharia law and other Islamic practices. These countries face their 
debt threshold at 84.90 percent of GDP. We study parliamentary democracies in view of 
their political economy dynamics and find the debt threshold at 87.49 percent of GDP. 
Federal democracies are of special interest of study in area of political economy. They are 
found to face their debt threshold at 40.73 percent of GDP. This threshold is substantially 
lower (almost by 57 percentage points) compared to the result of similar period analysis of 
the full sample. Kourtellos et al. (2013) show that public debt and economic growth are 
negatively correlated in countries with weak political institutions. Using a structural threshold 
regression model, they study the effects of government debt on the economic growth in a 
panel of 82 advanced and developing countries, and find strong evidence for threshold effects 
based on democracy, which implies that higher public debt results in lower growth for 
countries in the low-democracy regime. 
 
 Dictator led countries are of special interest in the study of political economy due to the 
whimsical and dictatorial policies of their ruling dictators. These countries face their debt 
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threshold at 88.87 percent of GDP. This threshold is about 9 percentage points lower than 
that of comparable period result of the full sample (97.95%). Monarchy countries are known 
for their allegiance to the ancient system of monarchic governance and their political 
economy is of special interest of study. The debt threshold of these countries is observed to 
be at 21.39 percent of GDP, which is significantly lower (almost by 76 percentage points) 
compared to that of the full sample. Finally, we study communist countries and find their debt 
threshold at 26.81 percent of GDP. This threshold is quite lesser compared to the result of the 
similar period of the full sample (almost lesser by 88 percentage points). 
 
The difference between the threshold for the full sample and the threshold for other 
political economy groupings such as monarchy countries, federal democracies, and 
social/communist countries suggests that these countries encounter growth rate challenges at 
comparatively lower debt to GDP levels. Our findings imply that the relationship between 
public debt and growth is moderated by the quality of countries‟ political economies. More 
particularly, the governance structures, political philosophies, institutional arrangements 
affect the debt levels and growth strategies of the countries. When a country‟s political 
economy and governance strategies lead to higher public debt, growth tends to decline (else 
equal). On the other hand, if a country‟s political economy and governance mechanisms are 
of sufficiently high quality leading to lower public debt, its negative effect on growth is 
largely mitigated. Our findings therefore argue that the long run effects of debt on growth and 
the debt thresholds are influenced by the interplay of policy factors in the context of the 
political economy of the country. 
Table 9: Panel threshold estimations for Economy groupings 
This table reports the estimated threshold levels of debt (as percent of GDP) with confidence intervals for 
different economy groupings for the period 1990-2009 as described in Table 4. The list of countries covered in 
the economy groupings is provided in Annexure 2. We also report the period of study sample, number of 
countries in the estimation panels, F-value, confidence interval at 95%, sum of squared residuals (SSR), and 
estimated residual variance (ERV). 
Economy groupings N Threshold level F-value C.I at 95% SSR ERV 
1. Advanced countries 
    
 
27 67.05 24.3246 029.5360 – 094.4381 1323.3420 2.5796 
2. BRICS countries 
      
 
5 31.47 26.3668 027.3560 – 040.7344 250.1693 2.6334 
3. Developing countries 
    
 
57 84.17 106.9891 082.7982 – 084.5670 21003.09 19.390 
4. Emerging economies 
    
 
21 24.69 31.0037 023.7850 – 025.0000 3309.055 8.2934 
5. OECD countries 
      
 
33 36.03 74.7392 035.5620 – 035.6166 2067.651 3.2977 
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 We notice highest debt threshold of 84.17 percent for developing countries and a lowest 
of 24.69 percent for emerging countries (see results in Table 9). For advanced countries, the 
debt threshold is found to be at 67.05 percent. We report the debt threshold 31.47 percent for 
BRICS group. For OECD group, we find the debt threshold at 36.03 percent. For a panel of 
20 advanced OECD countries with 5-year averages for the period from 1946-2009, Egert 
(2015) estimates the debt threshold at 33.27 percent of GDP that is closer to our estimation.  
 
 For a mix of 30 advanced and emerging market economies for the period 1970-2007,  
Kumar and Woo (2010) report the debt threshold at 90 percent (67 percent in our study). We 
attribute the difference in the threshold estimations largely to the number and type of 
countries included in the study and the period of analysis. Caner et al., (2010) with the help 
of threshold least squares regression model based on a yearly data set of 79 developing and 
developed economies spanning a time period from 1980 to 2008 estimate a threshold of 77 
percent public debt-to-GDP ratio.  
 
Table 10: Panel threshold estimations for Income groupings 
This table reports the estimated threshold levels of debt (as percent of GDP) with confidence intervals for 
different Income groupings for the period 1990-2009 as described in Table 4. The countries covered in the 
analysis are listed in Annexure 3. We also report the period of study sample, number of countries in the 
estimation panels, F-value, confidence interval at 95%, sum of squared residuals (SSR), and estimated 
residual variance (ERV). 
Income Groupings N Threshold level F-value C.I at 95% SSR ERV 
1. High Income Countries (HIC) 
    
 
38 62.35 35.5162 032.6113 – 081.0559 5005.597 06.9330 
2. Highly indebted Poor Countries (HPC) 
    
 
16 132.03 58.1505 121.0580 – 160.5020 4939.306 16.2477 
3. Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
    
 
12 128.77 82.7686 120.3022 – 160.5020 5018.676 22.0117 
4. Low Income Countries (LIC) 
    
 
11 119.54 65.9034 094.0000 – 160.5020 6056.577 28.9788 
5. Middle Income Countries (MIC) 
    
 
34 23.56 92.6421 023.1932 – 023.7850 9902.907 15.3296 
       
        
Our analysis for income groupings reveals that HPC countries have the highest debt 
threshold at 132.03 percent followed by LDC countries at 128.77 percent (see results in Table 
10). The study reports debt thresholds for other groupings as below: LIC countries – 119.54 
percent, HIC countries – 62.35 percent and MIC countries – 23.56 percent. 
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Table 11: Panel threshold estimations for Regional groupings 
This table reports the estimated threshold levels of debt (as percent of GDP) with confidence intervals for 
different regional groupings for the period 1990-2009 as described in Table 4. The countries covered in the 
analysis are listed in Annexure 5. We also report the period of study sample, number of countries in the 
estimation panels, F-value, confidence interval at 95%, sum of squared residuals (SSR), and estimated residual 
variance (ERV). 
Period N Threshold level F-value C.I at 95% SSR ERV 
     1. Africa 21 144.85 131.2557 121.0000 – 160.5020 6657.949 16.6866 
     2. Asia 19 45.61 31.9376 045.2970 – 111.4290 3534.039 09.7896
     3. Europe 34 78.19 102.6267 077.8340 – 079.0000 6419.172 09.9368
     4. North America 07 35.33 37.9909 032.6280 – 037.1741 813.4135 06.1159
       5. Oceania 04 55.92 40.949 053.6620 – 056.6070 255.9509 03.3676
     6. South America 15 84.17 28.2848 036.0396 – 142.9978 1383.447 04.8542
       
       
  
 Regional groupings analysis reveals that Africa face their debt threshold at 144.85 
percent followed by 35.33 percent for North America (see results in Table 11). Africa is 
followed by South America – 84.17, Europe – 78.19, Oceania – 55.92, and Asia – 45.61. 
Estimated thresholds in all country groupings are presented in Figure 6. 
 
 In a study of 12 euro-area countries over the period 1970–2008, estimations of 
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) suggest that growth reaches a maximum when the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is around 90–100 percent (78 percent in our study of 34 European 
countries). For the same euro-area countries, using one year lagged debt ratios in a non-linear 
threshold panel model, Baum et al. (2013) report that impact of debt loses its significance 
beyond debt-to-GDP ratios of around 67%. We attribute the differences in the threshold 
estimations to the factors associated with period of study, number of countries and the type of 
countries considered in these studies. 
 
Our results offer adequate empirical evidence to the argument that if debt thresholds 
exist, there should be theoretical and empirical reasons why they might vary by country type. 
Debt may play out differently in different groups of countries depending on various factors 
such as efficiency of domestic financial markets; degree of openness (Frankel and Romer, 
1999); and institutional structures and ease of access to financial markets (Alfaro and Vladim, 
2008). Debt levels may also have implications for growth through the inflation channel. 
Empirical studies report interconnection between fiscal deficits and inflation in low-income 
countries but no systematic connection in high-income countries (Catao and Terrones, 2005). 
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Figure 6: Debt Thresholds in Country Groupings 
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 This analysis offers a cogent underpinning for the debt-growth relationship by formally 
testing for the existence of a threshold and estimating the threshold values for different 
groupings of countries while controlling for other important variables that influence growth. 
The key findings are that the threshold level of the average long-run public debt to GDP ratio 
on GDP growth is dependent on: (i) The horizon of the analysis, (ii) types of economies, (iii) 
types of geographies of the economies (iv) types of income levels of the countries, and (v) 
types of political governance structures.  Though, the analysis of debt thresholds could be 
informative, but threshold levels needed to be interpreted with greater caution.  
 
4. Debt Intolerance and Growth Cost 
We extend our study to estimate the growth costs of exceeding the debt threshold. We 
do this by considering the debt threshold (114.81 percent rounded to 115 percent of GDP) 
estimated for our full sample of 103 countries (Table 4). We consider the econometric 
specifications provided in Eqn. (3) and Eqn. (4) to estimate the impact of debt on growth in 
debt regimes below and beyond the debt threshold.  
 
  jttj
j
tjS
j
t debtSGDPgrowth 
^
------- Eqn (3) 
 
Where Sj is a vector of Solow regressors including gfcf, gfc, tgdp, fce, fdi, infl, lagged GDP, 
pg, and adr. It also includes the constant. µj is country-specific fixed effects; νt is time-fixed 
effects; εjt is the unobservable error term.  
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First, we estimate the debt-growth association both under linear and nonlinear models 
in the regime below the debt threshold of 115 percent of GDP and then in the same approach 
for the regime beyond the debt threshold.   
 
Robustness checks 
In order to ensure that the outliers do not influence the results, we identify the outliers 
by drawing the scatterplot of the partial correlation between debt and growth obtained with 
the IV regression and estimate the models by dropping them. We use the Huber–White 
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sandwich correction to deal with the serially correlated residuals in the context of the 
presence of within-country time dependence and heteroscedacity of unknown form. An 
alternative approach of using the Newey and West estimator that allows modeling the 
autocorrelation process in the error term is also employed.  
 
The method of PCSEs (suggested by Beck and Katz) is very robust when there is little 
or no correlation between unit effects and explanatory variables. It is argued that its 
performance declines as the correlation strengthens. We use the fixed effects estimator with 
robust standard errors that appears to do better in these situations (Kristensen and Wawro, 
2003). 
 
 In addition, we test for the causality running from debt to growth employing Pairwise 
Demitrescu-Hurlin Panel Causality Tests. The results shown in Table 12 are significant and 
indicate causality running in both directions i.e. from debt to growth and growth to debt. 
 
Table 12: Results of Pairwise Demitrescu-Hurlin Panel Causality Tests 
        
Specifi- 
cation  
 Null Hypothesis: W-Stat. 
Zbar-
Stat. 
Prob.  
1 
 GDP growth does not homogeneously cause debt 4.6265 6.0140 2.00E-09 
 Debt does not homogeneously cause GDP growth 3.5252 3.0872 0.002 
 
        
 
We report the results of the econometric investigations in Table 13. We illustrate the 
debt-growth relationship for the regimes below and beyond the debt threshold (115% of 
GDP) in Figure 7.  
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 Table 13: Debt Threshold and its Growth Cost 
We report here the results of the estimations of growth costs as the debt exceeds the earlier estimated debt 
threshold (115 percent of GDP) in our study. We provide two analyses - one for below the debt threshold 
and the other for above the debt threshold. We run Panel Generalized Method of Moments regressions 
with appropriate instrument specifications. We employ 2SLS instrument weighting matrix with robust White 
period weights and use cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. The mean (in the first 
row) and standard deviations (in the second row) of the variables are provided in columns (I-1) and (II: 1). 
We report the coefficients followed by standard errors in the parenthesis in columns (I-2), (I-3), (II-2) and 
(II: 3) for the Panel GMM regressions of both linear and non-linear models. We also report the goodness-of-
fit indicators: R-squared values and Durbin-Watson Statistic.  
 I: (< debt threshold) II: (> debt threshold) 
Dependent variable: 
GDP growth 
Mean/Std. 
Dev 
Linear 
model 
(PGMM) 
Non linear 
model 
(PGMM) 
Mean/Std. 
Dev 
PGMM 
results 
Non linear 
model 
(PGMM) 
 (I-1) (I-2) (I-3) (II-1) (II-2) (II-3) 
Debt 
46.223 0.0190** 0.1282*** 194.53 -0.0097** -0.0286 
25.034 (0.0082) (0.0399) 151.36 (0.0037) (0.0512) 
GDP growth (1-lag) 
3.6479 0.4209*** 0.4220*** 0.8692 0.2811* 0.2198 
4.6654 (0.0420) (0.0430) 4.4367 (0.1572) (0.1509) 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
4.6475 0.1165*** 0.1180*** 8.5704 -0.0065 -0.0204 
15.551 (0.0121) (0.0386) 16.627 (0.0347) (0.0424) 
Government 
expenditure 
3.4805 0.0569*** 0.0572 -1.2602 -0.0588** -0.0856** 
7.6312 (0.0217) (0.0221) 19.433 (0.0262) (0.0396) 
Trade Openness 
81.845 0.0098 0.0142 70.651 0.0579 0.1033* 
52.609 (0.0102) (0.0107) 33.584 (0.0553) (0.0581) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
3.8375 0.0410 -0.0400 4.9828 0.02811 -0.0220 
5.2044 (0.0390) (0.0386) 6.0896 (0.0974) (0.0989) 
Inflation 
26.696 -0.0062*** -0.0066*** 584.35 4.26E-05 1.17E-04 
146.34 (0.0012) (0.0012) 3222.4 (0.00014) (0.00019) 
Final consumption 
expenditure 
 
 
-0.0466 
(0.0323) 
 
 
-0.1044 
(0.1195) 
Population growth  
 
-0.1137 
(0.2033) 
 
 
1.9566 
(0.7979) 
Debt-Squared  
 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
 
 
1.84E-05 
(4.65E-05) 
Intercept 
 -0.2086 0.9031  -1.4539 4.4586 
 (0.9278) (2.8326)  (3.5532) (14.191) 
R-squared  0.6348 0.6216  0.5411 0.5704 
Durbin-Watson Stat  2.019 1.979  2.031 2.05 
       
 
We find the degree of positive association of debt with growth in the debt regime below 
the debt threshold of 115 percent of GDP is econometrically significant in both the linear and 
non-linear specifications. The point estimates suggest that a 10-percentage point increase in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 0.19 (in linear model) and 1.28 (in non-linear model) 
percent increase in average real GDP growth. Estimating the growth cost as the debt exceeds 
the estimated debt threshold in the debt regimes beyond the debt threshold, we find negative 
association of debt with growth. The point estimates indicate that a 10-percentage point 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 0.097 (in linear model) and 0.286 (in 
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non-linear model) percent reduction of annual average real GDP growth (Table 14). 
Alternatively, every additional 10 percent rise in debt-to-GDP ratio beyond the debt threshold 
costs 01 to 28 basis points of a percentage point of annual average real GDP growth. 
 
Figure 7: Growth during below and beyond the debt threshold 
The first part of the figure illustrates the growth relationship in the regimes below the 
debt threshold (115% of GDP) and the second part presents the association in the 
regimes beyond the debt threshold.  
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 We notice that the average real GDP growth for countries with government debt 
beyond the debt threshold of 115 percent of GDP is 1.14 (median 1.89). For the countries 
with debt below the threshold, the average real GDP growth is noticed at 3.42 (median 3.79). 
On the other hand, Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) challenging RR‟s findings for 20 
advanced countries, observe that the average real GDP growth rate for countries carrying a 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90 percent is actually 2.2 percent, not -0.1 percent as 
published by RR 
 
Some of the studies report comparable results. Caner et al., (2010) study 79 developing 
and developed economies spanning from 1980 to 2008 and observe that if debt is above their 
estimated threshold of 77 percent of GDP, each additional percentage point of debt costs 
0.017 to 0.02 percentage points of annual real growth. In their study of 18 OECD countries, 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) show that 10 percentage points increase in the initial debt-to-GDP 
ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of approximately 
20 basis points. 
We have thus provided empirical evidence to the hypothesis that surpassing the debt 
threshold is costly for countries. Our analysis is based on long-term data, so that temporary 
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deviations from the average need not have important negative effects on growth. In all 
likelihood, economic growth deteriorates if debt explosions push the debt ratios beyond the 
debt threshold and keep them there for decades. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion  
 The study finds the debt thresholds to vary in the range of 84 to 114 percent of GDP for 
the full sample for the different periods of analysis ranging from 10 to 50 years. The debt 
threshold estimations for political governance groupings reveal different thresholds: dictator 
led countries (88.87), parliamentary democracies (87.49), Islamic countries (84.90), coalition 
countries (84.30), federal democracies (40.73), socialist/communist countries (26.81), and 
monarchy countries (21.39). 
 Debt thresholds for different economy groupings are in the range of 24 to 84 percent. 
Developing economies experience the highest debt threshold at 84.17 percent of GDP, 
followed by advanced economies (67.05), OECD countries (36.03), BRICS (31.47) and 
emerging economies (24.69). 
 Income groupings of countries experience their debt threshold in the range of 24 to 132. 
Middle-income countries have the lowest debt threshold (24) and highly indebted poor 
countries have the highest debt threshold (132.03). On the other hand, high-income countries 
experience debt threshold at 62.35 while the low-income countries face their debt threshold at 
119.54. Further, least developed countries experience debt threshold at 128.77. These results 
reveal that since low-income countries suffer from inadequate government revenues to fund 
their investment needs, their level of debt requirement stays higher compared to the middle-
income countries that are found to generate reasonable level of government revenues to 
finance their investment needs.    
 Amongst the regional groupings, North America experiences lowest debt threshold 
(35.33) and Africa experiences the highest debt threshold (144.85). Africa is followed by 
South America (84.17), Europe (78.19), Oceania (55.92), and Asia (45.61).    
 The existence of debt threshold incited us to estimate the cost of exceeding it. We 
estimate the growth costs of exceeding the debt threshold by considering the debt threshold 
115 percent of GDP estimated for the full sample. The point estimates indicate that every 
additional 10 percent rise in debt-to-GDP ratio beyond the debt threshold costs 10 to 30 basis 
points of annual average real GDP growth. 
 We have provided empirical evidence to the hypothesis that surpassing the debt 
threshold is costly for countries. Our analysis is based on long-term data, so that temporary 
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deviations from the average need not have important negative effects on growth. Our 
conclusions made in the study, though based on econometric analysis, are open to questions 
and debate. We do not claim that the results are infallible, but do state that they are based on 
widely accepted econometric tools and based on sound economic logic. We opine that, in all 
likelihood, economic growth deteriorates if debt explosions push the debt ratios beyond the 
debt threshold and keep them there for decades. 
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Appendices 
 
Annexure 1: Countries covered in Debt Regime groupings 
1 DR 0-30 (21) 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Namibia, 
Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Romania, Slovenia, and Thailand. 
2 DR 31-60 (31) 
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  
El Salvador, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, RB. 
3 DR 61-90 (22) 
Algeria, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Arab Rep., Egypt, Arab Rep., 
Greece, Ireland, Panama, and Singapore. 
4 DR 91-150 (8) 
Belgium, Burundi, Central African Republic, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. 
5 DR 151 and above (5) Congo, Dem. Rep., Cyprus, Malta, Nicaragua, and Zambia 
 
 
Annexure 2: Countries covered in Economy groupings 
1 
Advanced Countries 
(27) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
2 BRICS (5) Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
3 
Developing Countries 
(57) 
Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Congo, Congo Rep, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,  Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Zambia 
4 
Emerging economies 
(21) 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.  
5 OECD Countries (33) 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States. 
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Annexure 3: Countries covered in Income groupings 
1 
High Income Countries 
HIC (38) 
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, 
China, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad 
and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States 
2 
Highly indebted Poor 
Countries HPC (16) 
Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo DR, Congo R, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Uganda, and Zambia. 
3 
Least Developed 
Countries LDC (12) 
Bhutan, Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia 
4 
Low Income Countries 
LIC (11) 
Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Uganda 
5 
Middle Income 
Countries (34) 
Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
China, Colombia, Congo R, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mauritius,  
Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South 
Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela 
 
 
Annexure 4: Countries covered in Political economy groupings 
1 Coalition Countries (31) 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and 
United Kingdom. 
2 
Parliamentary 
Democracies (16) 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and Turkey. 
3 Islamic Countries (22) 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gambia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uganda. 
4 Dictator led Countries (8) 
Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
5 Monarchy Countries (4) Bahrain, Jordan, Luxembourg, and Oman 
6 Federal Democracies (14) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, 
India, Mexico, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 
7 
Socialist/Communist 
Countries (2) 
Algeria and China 
 
 
Annexure 5: Countries covered in Regional groupings 
1 Africa (21) 
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo DR, Congo R, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia 
2 Asia (19) 
Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea R, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey 
3 Europe (34) 
Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom 
4 
North 
America (07) 
Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and United States 
5 Oceania (04) Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea 
6 
South 
America (15) 
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
